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EDWARD S. CORWIN AND THE AMERICAN CONSTI-
TUTION: A BIBLIOGRAPHICAL ANALYSIS. By Ken-
neth D. Crews.' Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press. 1985. 
Pp. xiv, 226. $35.00. 
THE PRESIDENT, OFFICE AND POWERS 1787-1984: 
HISTORY AND ANALYSIS OF THEORY AND PRAC-
TICE. By Edward S. Corwin.2 Fifth Revised Edition by 
Randall W. Bland,3 Theodore T. Hindson,4 and Jack W. 
Peltason.s New York: New York University Press. 1984. 
Pp. xxii, 565. Cloth, $45.00; paper, $20.00. 
CONSTITUTIONAL CONFLICTS BETWEEN CON-
GRESS AND THE PRESIDENT. By Louis Fisher.6 
Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press. 1984. Pp. xviii, 
372. Cloth, $40.00; paper, $8.95. 
Charles A. Lofgren7 
Edward S. Corwin, the leading American constitutional com-
mentator of the first half of the twentieth century, bequeathed a rich 
legacy. He authored or co-authored twenty books, over sixty arti-
cles in professional journals in history, law, and political science, 
150 book reviews, and a large miscellany of short notes, articles in 
popular and "high brow" publications, and other items.s During 
I. Member, California Bar, and doctoral student at the University of California, Los 
Angeles. 
2. Late McCormick Professor of Jurisprudence, Princeton University. 
3. Professor of Political Science, Southwest Texas State University, San Marcos. 
4. Professor of Political Science, Southwest Texas State University, San Marcos. 
5. President American Council on Education; Chancellor, University of California, 
Irvine. 
6. Specialist in American National Government with the Congressional Research Ser-
vice, Library of Congress. 
7. Roy P. Crocker Professor of American Politics and History, Claremont McKenna 
College. 
8. I base these figures on the listings in K. CREWS, EDWARDS. CORWIN AND THE 
193 
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his career, he was a frequent subject of news reports and a sought-
after source of instant constitutional analysis; and since his death in 
1963 his scholarship has continued to be consulted. Who of us does 
not turn to the Library of Congress's annotated Constitution of the 
United States, still based significantly on Corwin's 1953 edition?9 
Who has not had occasion to use The President, Office and Powers 
and marvel at its richness? His writings, moreover, have been the 
subject of several critical studies. 
Constitutional scholars are indebted to Kenneth D. Crews and 
Greenwood Press for bringing out what is likely to remain the defin-
itive Corwin bibliography (even though Crews himself notes that a 
few other items are likely to surface). The compilation also identi-
fies writings about Corwin, both during his career and since his 
death. Not least, Crews has provided a short (48-page) biographical 
introduction, drawn partly from oral interviews and the Corwin 
archive at Princeton, that makes fascinating reading for anyone in 
the academic business. Its contents range from tidbits to serious 
insights into the scholar-teacher. 
We learn, for example, that Corwin's afterhours bull sessions 
with law students, while he was a freshman in college, helped fire 
his lifelong interest in constitutional law. By 1900, when he gained 
his bachelor's degree from the University of Michigan, his under-
graduate mentor, Andrew C. McLaughlin, himself one of the early 
"greats" in the constitutional field, concluded, "I cannot teach this 
young man anything; he already knows all about the subject." In 
1905, fresh with a Ph.D. in American history from the University of 
Pennsylvania, Corwin was one of the initial group of preceptors that 
Woodrow Wilson brought to Princeton University, as part of his 
effort at curricular reform. Almost from the beginning, however, 
Corwin had significant differences with the future President. This 
divergence carried into Wilson's presidential years, when Corwin, 
by then a full professor at Princeton, proffered the advice that Wil-
son should invoke national supremacy through concluding a treaty 
with Japan in order to resolve tensions created by California's mis-
treatment of Japanese immigrants. In a personal letter to his pro-
tege, Wilson pointedly refused, asserting, "I do not feel by any 
means as confident as you do as to the power of the Federal Gov-
AMERICAN CONSTITUTION: A BIBLIOGRAPHICAL ANALYSIS (1985) [hereinafter cited as 
CREWS], and have omitted short notes from the count of scholarly articles and books com-
piled after Corwin's death from the book count. For slightly different figures, see E. 
CORWIN, THE PRESIDENT, OFFICE AND POWERS 1787-1984, at xi (R. Bland, T. Hindson, & 
J. Peltason 5th ed. 1984) (revisers' introduction) [hereinafter cited as CORWIN (5th ed.)]. 
9. See LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF 
AMERICA: ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETATION (1973). 
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ernment in the matter of overriding the constitutional powers of the 
states through the instrumentality of treaties . . . . " Notwith-
standing such differences, Corwin was probably disappointed at not 
receiving a position in the Wilson administration. to 
From the same era, Corwin's attraction to Teddy Roosevelt's 
New Nationalism foreshadowed his welcoming of Franklin D. 
Roosevelt's New Deal, which he proclaimed the test of "the capac-
ity of the Constitution to absorb a revolution." The New Deal also 
gave his scholarly expertise greater practical outlet, including a stint 
with the Housing Office of the Public Works Administration and a 
consulting (if partly unwitting) role in shaping the Court-packing 
plan. 
By the post-World War II period, however, Corwin questioned 
the growth of presidential power and the waning of state authority. 
But his opinions did not fit into any of the conventional ideological 
grooves, as he proved when he co-chaired the committee that di-
rected the successful effort to block the Bricker Amendment. By 
restricting treaties and executive agreements, the proposal would 
arguably have assuaged some of Corwin's latter-day concerns, yet 
he held fast to earlier commitments in this area. Also, though 
neither an avid fan of civil rights nor an advanced civil libertarian, 
in 1951-52 he joined an unpopular local effort to protect the rights 
of the "Trenton Six," a group of New Jersey blacks charged with 
murder. Finally, because the confusion did not end with his death, 
it bears underscoring that Corwin's first name was not "Edwin," an 
appellation that bedeviled him throughout his life. (It rhymed with 
Corwin.)tt 
All told, perhaps the most intriguing episode was the boomlet 
to place the Princeton professor on the Supreme Court. Corwin 
had given the New Deal public scholarly support, both by arguing 
for the constitutional adequacy of the new agencies and by ques-
tioning the Court's freeswinging role. By the mid-1930's, moreover, 
he had emerged as one of the nation's most quoted constitutional 
authorities; hence, as FDR's troubles with the Court grew, public 
speculation centered on an appointment for the academician. Not 
least, Corwin himself was well aware of the prospect. "He joked 
10. CREWS, supra note 8, at 1-15. (The quotation from McLaughlin is at 5; the one 
from Wilson, at 12.) 
II. /d. at 7-10, 23-48. (The quotation about the New Deal is at 23.) In a brief fore-
word, Alpheus T. Mason, a Corwin student and colleague and his successor in the McCor-
mick Chair of Jurisprudence at Princeton, adds two other gems: Corwin claimed never to 
have spent more than eight weeks on anything he wrote; and, by Mason's reckoning, he put 
in no more than a half-hour's preparation for an undergraduate lecture, going in with a few 
scribbled notes. /d. at ix. 
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with students about joining the Court," Crews reports, "and report-
ers and friends approached him with the idea incessantly."12 
Then came the announcement of the Court-packing plan, in 
February 1937. In particular, Corwin's appearance before the Sen-
ate Judiciary Committee, as the administration's lead-off "expert 
witness," offered him an opportunity to solidify support for nomina-
tion to a seat when one fell vacant. But the hearing did not provide 
the forum Corwin had expected-the role of witness did not allow 
the intellectual repartee produced by Socratic exchange in the class-
room. Then, too, his examiners noted his own late conversion to 
the merits of enlarging the Court, which made him look opportunis-
tic and marked him as a partisan. The Court plan failed, the ap-
pointment never came, and a degree of embitterment set in. In 1940 
the professor proclaimed his support for Wendell Willkie on the 
ground that the two-term limit was part of the American constitu-
tional tradition; and with the introduction of the Lend-Lease Bill at 
the beginning of 1941, Corwin described Roosevelt's power as as-
suming the shape of "truly royal prerogative."I3 
The Court episode may lend credence to the adage sometimes 
applied to academicians, that power corrupts and the absolute lack 
of power corrupts absolutely. (Some may ask whether the observa-
tion also applies to Corwin's shift during the Wilson Presidency, 
when he came out for Charles Evans Hughes in 1916 and later sided 
with Henry Cabot Lodge in the fight over the League of Nations.)I4 
But I wonder whether Corwin was as disappointed as Crews and 
others suggest. He knew too much about Court appointments to 
have harbored many illusions about his own chances, whatever the 
speculations in the press. He possessed no political base; and not 
only did he have no judicial experience-this master of the Consti-
tution was not even a certified lawyer. Furthermore, his later intel-
lectual and political shifts were not entirely unheralded by earlier 
commitments. Certainly, too, new events-which raised new ques-
tions and challenged the adequacy of old answers-must compete 
as factors explaining his altered outlook. Is 
One product of Corwin's later years was The President, Office 
and Powers. First appearing in 1940, it was revised in 1941 and, 
12. /d. at 26. 
13. See id. at 26-32; Garvey, Scholar in Politics: Edward Corwin and the 1937 Court· 
Packing Battle, 31 PRINCETON U. LIBR. CHRON. I (1969). 
14. See CREWS, supra note 8, at 12-15. 
15. See CORWIN (5th ed.), supra note 8, at xvi-xvii (revisers' introduction). In particu-
lar, however much he supported a Presidency adequate to protect national security, Corwin 
cringed at the long-run implications of the war-produced merging of executive and legislative 
authority through the medium of delegatory legislation. See, e.g., id. at 297; CREWS, supra 
note 8, at 37-39. 
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after his formal retirement in 1946 at age 68, went through further 
revisions in 1948 and 1957. The last of these editions consisted of 
313 pages of text and 181 pages of notes, themselves a mine of ex-
tended citations, collateral commentary, and relevant documents. 
The organization was topical, the seven chapters covering "Concep-
tions of the Office," "The Apparatus of the Presidency," "Adminis-
trative Chief," "Chief Executive," "Organ of Foreign Relations," 
"Commander-in-Chief in Wartime," and "Legislative Leader and 
'Institution.'" The prose was vintage Corwin-pithy and some-
times biting (following Mencken, FDR became "Roosevelt 11")-
and the substance of the book combined the insights of political 
philosophy with aptly chosen historical evidence. Nor did it neglect 
traditional legal sources; although court decisions per se by no 
means dominated the account, in Corwin's hands they sprang to 
life. Overall, The President was informed by a sense that the Presi-
dency was a fit unit for study-it made a difference (for good and 
ill), and it had a dynamic character which defied formulaic ap-
proaches. A reader cannot help but be impressed by the mature 
learning it incorporates; surely Corwin's breadth of scholarship, es-
pecially in his early years, played a role here.t6 
In the 1957 edition, Corwin offered this summary assessment 
of the factors producing the Presidency of the mid-1950's: 
(I) social acceptance of the idea that government should be active and reformist, 
rather than simply protective of the established order of things; (2) the breakdown 
of the principle of dual federalism in the field of Congress's legislative powers; 
(3) the breakdown of the principle of Separation of Powers as defining the relation 
of President and Congress in lawmaking; (4) the breakdown of the corollary princi-
ple that the legislature may not delegate its powers; and (5) the impact on the Presi-
dent's power as Commander-in-Chief . . . of two world wars and the vastly 
enlarged role of the United States in the international field.17 
Yet, despite his concerns about the heritage of Roosevelt II and the 
growing impact of presidential personality on the power of the of-
fice, he remained bullish about American democracy.ts What is 
perhaps equally intriguing is the insight this passage provides about 
Corwin's conception of constitutional scholarship, for he prefaced 
his listing-and note again its first item-with the remarkable com-
16. Not only does Crews's bibliography disclose Corwin's versatility within the consti-
tutional area; it reveals that in 1907, for example, he edited a general history of Scandinavia, 
and in 1916 published French Policy and the American Alliance of 1778, an expanded version 
of his 1905 Ph.D. dissertation in American history at the University of Pennsylvania. See 
CREWS, supra note 8, items A3 & Bl.l. 
17. E. CORWIN, THE PRESIDENT, OFFICE AND POWERS 1787-1957, at 311-12 (4th rev. 
ed. 1957). 
18. See id. at 312. He seemed less hopeful, however, about the impact of the Presidency 
on personal rights. 
198 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 3:193 
ment that it explained the office "so far as it is explicable in terms of 
American constitutional law and theory."19 
This classic has now been reissued in a fifth edition, but, as the 
three revisers admit, the revision is limited in scope. Although 
repaginated, the text and notes of the 1957 edition remain un-
changed. A new eight-page introduction assesses Corwin's life and 
work, and postscripts of three to nine pages apiece (including up-
dated bibliographies) have been appended to each chapter. 
The result is adequate but hardly dazzling. Not that the deci-
sion to leave the core of the 1957 edition untouched was wrong, for 
the revisers are surely correct in remarking that "only Corwin could 
revise Corwin."2o Nor, by my reckoning, do the postcripts omit 
many, if any, of the most significant developments in the Presidency 
since the late fifties. Instead, the letdown comes because, juxta-
posed against the original text, the new material seems awfully thin. 
For example, Corwin conveyed a good deal about the impact of 
presidential personality-especially that of Roosevelt li-on the 
constitutional growth of the office, but the new additions give the 
reader little comparable feel for Lyndon Johnson or Richard Nixon, 
each of whom possessed fascinating personal traits that unquestion-
ably influenced the modem constitutional order. To be sure, one 
postscript surveys the recent analytical literature on presidential 
character and style,21 but this is hardly a substitute for ongoing at-
tention to the interaction between personality and institutional 
change. Similarly, the court cases that enter into the updates ap-
pear as titles and summaries of holdings-not as the contests in-
volving real people and events that Corwin skillfully wove into The 
President-and other major documents receive similarly fiat 
treatment. 
I also have several narrower complaints. The Economic Stabi-
lization Act of 1970, the reader is told at one point, "was enacted 
... by the use of concurrent resolution ... "-a clear mistake 
which is compounded by the howler that Corwin, because he ap-
proved the use of concurrent resolutions as legislative vetoes, 
"would have urged" this constitutionally unknown method of en-
acting a law.22 Just over a page later, in a discussion of the War 
19. /d. at 311. In the 5th edition, the comments discussed in this paragraph are at 358· 
59. 
20. CoRWIN (5th ed.), supra note 8, at xi. 
21. See id. at 32-34. 
22. Jd. at 194-95 (emphasis added). For the Economic Stabilization Act of 1970, see 
Pub. L. No. 91-379, 84 Stat. 799 (1970). The postscript also incorrectly cites the act as 83 
Stat. 377, which is the same incorrect citation that is included in the secondary source that 
the postscript cites in its short discussion of the act. See CoRWIN (5th ed.), supra note 8, at 
194 & nn.3-4. For a brief history of the Act and subsequent amendments, see L. FISHER, 
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Powers Resolution, one discovers that "[affter ninety days, Con-
gress may pass a concurrent resolution calling on the president to 
withdraw American troops. "23 Only two postscripts later does an 
accurate summary of the measure appear, including the now-invali-
dated provision for congressional veto of a military action within 
sixty days.24 And at least in the review copy I received, page 154 is 
missing, replaced by a reprint of page 153. Readers will have to 
tum to page 132 of the 1957 edition to find the omitted text. But to 
conclude on a more positive note, the new bibliographies are use-
ful-even if Nelson Polsby becomes Nelson Polsky in one entry2s_ 
and the revisers' introduction is informative. 
Louis Fisher has provided a truer successor to Corwin's The 
President. A revision of his The Constitution Between Friends, 
Fisher's Constitutional Conflicts Between Congress and the President 
is an integrated whole, and the new title, if less catchy, is more ac-
curate. (The earlier heading came from an alleged incident involv-
ing Grover Cleveland and a Tammany chieftain; when the 
President explained a veto as the result of his constitutional objec-
tions, the politician queried, "What's the Constitution between 
friends?"26) Fisher, on the contrary, takes the Constitution with 
refreshing seriousness. 
To be sure, he devotes little space to discussing how to inter-
pret the document, and readers will find no agonizing over "inter-
pretivism," "noninterpretivism," and the like. He instead sets the 
stage by quoting Lord Bolingbroke's analysis of the English Consti-
tution as "an assemblage of laws, institutions and customs. "27 This 
leads him immediately into a thoughtful portrayal of the American 
"constitutional setting," which, he argues, allows for several modes 
of interpretation and growth. Indeed, it is only constitutional 
change through blind legislative acquiescence in executive initia-
tives that draws his ire.2s 
The remainder of the book is a topically organized, thoroughly 
CONSTITUTIONAL CONFLICTS BETWEEN CONGRESS AND THE PRESIDENT 114-15 nn.50-53 
(1985) [hereinafter cited as FISHER]. 
23. CoRWIN (5th ed.), supra note 8, at 196 (emphasis added). 
24. /d. at 299-301. As the revisers mention in passing, the WPR's provision for veto by 
concurrent resolution was almost surely overturned by Immigration and Naturalization Serv. 
v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983). For a useful review, see Glennon, The War Powers Resolu-
tion Ten Years Later: More Politics Than Law, 78 AM. J. INT'L L. 571 (1984). 
25. See CORWIN (5th ed.), supra note 8, at 36. 
26. L. FISHER, THE CONSTITUTION BETWEEN FRIENDS: CONGRESS, THE PRESIDENT, 
AND THE LAW at v (1978), which also includes another version of the tale. I note that the 
preface to the new edition omits the episode. 
27. FISHER, supra note 22, at 3, (quoting from C. MciLWAIN, CONSTITUTIONALISM: 
ANCIENT AND MODERN 3 (1947)). 
28. See id. at 3-27. 
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up-to-date discussion of most of the subjects covered in The Presi-
dent. Some further chapter highpoints: "Appointment Powers" 
(chapter 2) includes attention to the little-studied intricacies of both 
recess appointments and the separate category of temporary ap-
pointments. Fisher concludes that the "appointment power oper-
ates in a framework of studied ambiguity, its limits established for 
the most part not by court decisions but by imaginative accommo-
dations between the executive and legislative branches."29 
Next, a detailed review of the removal power (chapter 3) 
reveals that the "decision of 1789," as Corwin labeled it,3o did not 
involve a neatly defined choice between three or four distinct posi-
tions on who could remove executive officers, as is so often stated, 
and in the end it settled little-witness the disputes in our own cen-
tury. In this connection, interestingly, Fisher gently chastises 
Corwin, pointing out that when the Supreme Court handed down 
Myers v. United States (1926),31 Corwin levied a telling attack on 
Chief Justice William Howard Taft's use of logic and history, and 
particularly his claim that the President could remove any executive 
officer. Such rigid rules would not do. Yet Corwin himself was 
distinctly uneasy at Justice George Sutherland's use of the term 
"quasi," in Humphrey's Executor v. United States (1935),32 to de-
scribe the blending of judicial and legislative functions in the Fed-
eral Trade Commission. "[I]f a Federal Trade Commissioner is not 
in the executive department, where is he?" Corwin asked. "In the 
legislative department; or is he, forsooth, in the uncomfortable half-
way situation of Mahomet's coffin, suspended 'twixt Heaven and 
Earth?" And when it came to the controversy over loyalty remov-
als in the 1950's, Corwin relied on none other than Myers to support 
the President's "overriding power" to fire suspected employees, 
without regard to due process.33 Further disputes under Carter and 
Reagan involving Inspectors General and Civil Rights Commission-
ers are only some of the most recent episodes; and the record fairly 
well establishes that Congress has ample resources both to protect 
the tenure of officeholders (as in the case of "whistleblower" Ernest 
Fitzgerald) and to force removal (as with Veterans Administration 
head Robert P. Nimmo in 1982).34 
29. !d. at 59. 
30. CoRWIN (5th ed.), supra note 8, at 101-02. 
31. 272 u.s. 52. 
32. 295 U.S. 602, 628-29. 
33. For Corwin's views that are discussed in this section of FISHER, supra note 22, see 
Corwin, Tenure of Office and the Removal Power Under the Constitution, 27 CoLUM. L. REV. 
353 (1927); CORWIN (5th ed.). supra note 8, at 104-108, 431 n.109. 
34. See FISHER, supra note 22. at 60-98. 
1986] BOOK REVIEW 201 
In the area of legislative power, Fisher pairs problems of dele-
gation (chapter 4) with the range of veto options open to Congress 
(chapter 5, which also reviews the intricacies of presidential vetoes). 
He is not troubled by extensive legislative delegations and, aside 
from the efforts of the Old Court in the 1930's, finds that the judi-
cial response has been largely captured in Robert Cushman's 
syllogism: 
(I) Major Premise: Legislative power cannot be constitutionally delegated by 
Congress; (2) Minor Premise: It is essential that certain powers be delegated to 
administrative officers and regulatory commissions; (3) Conclusion: Therefore the 
powers thus delegated are not legislative powers.35 
The real question, Fisher stresses, is how to control delegated au-
thority, a task now made more difficult by Immigration and Natu-
ralization Service v. Chadha (1983).36 Not surprisingly, he adds his 
voice to those criticizing the decision as "play[ing] fast and free 
with history" and at odds with the true interests of both political 
branches. "No one should underestimate the ingenuity of Congress 
to think up devices that will be more cumbersome for the President 
than the legislative veto," he cautions. Possibilities include require-
ments for specific approval of spending deferrals or reorganization 
plans through joint resolutions, grants of authority more limited in 
time (thereby forcing the executive branch to seek frequent renew-
als), and creative use of appropriations procedures to get informal 
commitments from agency heads.37 (More about this in a moment.) 
When it comes to "power over knowledge" (chapter 6), 
Fisher's book reveals tensions between constitutionally rooted inter-
ests. Most likely, these tensions cannot be resolved. Congressional 
investigatory power and protection of Congressmen and their aides 
under the speech or debate clause are essential to the legislative pro-
cess, yet each may threaten citizens' rights, and at its core each has 
proved immune from judicial check-a reality Fisher notes but 
downplays. On the other side, courts have recognized executive 
privilege, which at its core (particularly in matters involving foreign 
affairs) seems immune from legislative or judicial inquiry. But 
Fisher's overall assessment points ultimately to congressional 
supremacy if matters ever are pushed to extremes, for there remains 
the impeachment process, the "most solemn form" of the congres-
sional investigative power; and here, against a determined Congress, 
there would be no check. Fisher keeps this prospect in the back-
ground, however, as a kind of tacit prod to acceptance of the pat-
35. /d. at 100-101 (footnote omitted). 
36. 462 U.S. 919. 
37. FISHER, supra note 22, at 178-83. (The quotations are at 179 & 181-82). 
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tern of accommodation which he again argues has been, and should 
continue to be, the dominant pattern in the constitutional order.Js 
In theory, "the power of the purse" (chapter 7) is a little like 
the impeachment power in theory. Aside from a handful of restric-
tions on areas or objects for which money can be spent (or not be 
spent), appropriations are entirely discretionary with Congress-
even for so-called entitlement programs-and could be a weapon of 
enormous significance in interbranch conflicts. But the appropria-
tions power in practice has become a loose cannon, or worse, de-
spite a rich history of budgetary reforms (and Fisher carefully 
chronicles these efforts). Congress, largely for ill, has checked exec-
utive control over large areas of the budget, but the need for legisla-
tive majorities to approve annual figures has in turn largely 
eliminated effective spending controls within Congress. Meanwhile, 
Presidents have found their way around a variety of clear legislative 
budgetary mandates, and now Chadha has opened more loopholes 
for the President. Indeed, Fisher's stance itself indicates the seri-
ousness of the problem, for he pretty much throws up his hands. 
The reality, and one fundamental enough to have constitutional sig-
nificance, is that "[r]ecent budgetary practices have brought trans-
formation without progress, expertise without mastery, and 
information without understanding."39 
Through no fault of his own, Fisher's treatments of "treaties 
and executive agreements" (chapter 8) and "the war power" (chap-
ter 9) are perhaps the least revealing, but only because the subjects 
are common staples in most discussions of the constitutional dimen-
sions of executive-legislative conflict. He manages nonetheless to 
offer relatively fresh glimpses, noting, for example, the recent prac-
tice of including Senators and Representatives on diplomatic negoti-
ating teams; the nugatory status of the Logan Act in light of such 
activities as citizen Nixon's 1976 trip to China, Ramsey Clark's 
1980 visit to Iran, and Jesse Jackson's travels in the Middle East 
and Latin America; and the probable desuetude of the War Powers 
Resolution's less well-known relative, the National Emergencies 
Act of 1976. Among areas that will likely see further development, 
he includes the de facto roles of the House in approval of treaties, of 
the Senate in the termination of treaties, and of both Houses to-
gether in controlling executive agreements. His evaluation and 
analysis of the War Powers Resolution is fair-minded, concluding 
38. See id. at 184-220. 
39. See id. at 221-51. (The quotation is at 251.) Earlier, in his discussion of the veto 
power, Fisher discounts the worth of a presidential item veto to solve the problem. See id. at 
159-62. 
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that whatever problems Chadha has created for the control mecha-
nism established by the WPR, the real difficulty is congressional 
wavering in the face of presidential reluctance to comply forth-
rightly with the Resolution's provisions.40 
Specialists, I suspect, will find little that is new in those sec-
tions of Constitutional Conflicts that focus on their own areas of 
expertise, and in some instances one may quibble over details or 
question broader interpretations.4I On balance, Fisher's sympathies 
obviously lie with Congress, so that, for instance, when he urges 
interbranch accommodation in order to solve conflicts over access 
to knowledge, he also cautions that although it may be proper for 
the judiciary to bow to executive claims of privilege based on na-
tional security and cognate considerations, the legislature should 
hesitate before showing similar deference. 42 But one reason for this 
slant may be that Fisher, like Corwin before him, perceives execu-
tive aggrandizement as the current wave, despite the blip of reaction 
that Watergate produced. Certainly his verdict of relative congres-
sional impotence regarding enforcement of the War Powers Resolu-
tion evidences little optimism. And even his sanguine assessment of 
Congress's post-Chadha options is less convincing in light of his ac-
knowledgment that our national legislature seems simply unable to 
get its budgetary house in order. 
On the whole, Constitutional Conflicts is a successful attempt 
to probe America's "constitutional enterprise," to borrow a term 
from Professor Harris, who nicely captures what I take to be 
Fisher's unstated premise when he writes, "The [Constitution's] 
words narrate the polity into existence and, as its working principles 
unfold, the polity becomes a kind of large-scale text in its own 
right."43 Without doubt, anyway, Fisher sees the constitutional en-
terprise as a "complex of relations between text and polity, word 
and structure," to draw again on Harris's formulation.44 For this 
reason, Edward Corwin would welcome Constitutional Conflicts. 
40. See id. at 284-325. 
41. Were I feeling more quibblish, I would do more than mention that one of his cita-
tions does not really support the referenced text; compare id. at 109, text associated with n. 
30, with Lofgren, United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corporation: An Historical Reas-
sessment, 83 YALE L.J. I (1973). 
42. See FISHER, supra note 22, at 218-20. 
43. Harris, Bonding Word and Polity: The Logic of American Constitutionalism, 76 
AM. PoL. SCI. REV. 34 (1982). 
44. /d. at 44. For the sake of clarity, however, it needs noting that Fisher avoids the 
kind of theoretical analysis which Harris undertakes. 
